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Tenn who Cares? 
Preface 
Let me begin by giving the purpose of my project. I began researching TennCare 
as an innovative Tennessee program. One which attempted to solve ever Increasing 
Medicaid costs, while at the same time extending health care opportunities to groups that 
were not covered by Medicaid, but still could be classified as poor. This basic 
framework has remained constant, and in light of recent developments my goal is as 
follows. 
An informed populace is vital to making a democracy work, even a representative 
democracy. Citizens need to be well informed to make the best decisions (relative to 
their own beliefs). We seem to live in an age of apathy, when barely one half of eligible 
voters exercise that right during a Presidential election and even fewer people vote at 
other times. In the 2000 Presidential Election, only 51.3% of the voting age population 
exercised their right to vote. Furthermore, almost 50 million people old enough to vote 
are not registered ("Voter Registration and Turnout 2000"). And this was actually higher 
than expected. Attempts to influence elected leaders are few as well on an individual 
level, leading one to believe that few people really care about public policy anymore. 
Yet, there are still a great many of our citizens who vote, realize how policies effect 
them, want to shape policy, etc. Surely being fully informed about the issues enables an 
individual to support the appropriate position. But also, if we take a pluralistic view of 
the world (and it is understandable that pluralism can be true, at least in part), then this 
belief would seem to work on an even larger scale. As individuals form groups to 
achieve specific goals, any lack of, or distorted, information would cause inefficiency in 
the political process. But with high levels of information, individuals are able to 
intelligently support policies and programs that effect them, joining groups to enhance 
their political power in support of those goals. This prevents an individual from 
supporting one side of an issue, only to change his or her position often upon the receipt 
of any new information. 
TennCare is one program area that, in general, the public is not adequately 
informed about. A perfect example was given by our local news media recently. One 
individual, when asked how to rectify Tennessee's current budget problems responded by 
castigating TennCare and making references to the elderly who, it was claimed, were a 
drain on the state's resources. This person, who will remain anonymous, is typical of 
many, though certainly not all, Tennesseeans. While some of the state's citizens are well 
informed concerning TennCare, this case proves that others are not. This individual and 
all others like him are my target audience. They apparently lack even the basic 
knowledge to make a decision regarding TennCare, and all the public opinion polls 
regarding anything relating to TennCare are not very useful as more than a very short-
term guide to public opinion. Hopefully, by the end of this paper it will be understood 
just how incorrect this man is. My secondary audience is the group of people who are 
already informed about TennCare. I hope to add to their knowledge if possible, and 
perhaps bring a fresh perspective to the opinions of that group. 
Let me continue to introduce my topic with the idea that the budget should be a 
reflection of the state's values. Important programs, projects, etc., will get adequate 
funding as the state's goals are furthered. Ifwe assume that the populace is informed and 
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that legislators are responsive to public opinion, then the budget should reflect, though 
perhaps not with perfect accuracy, the views of the people. I say this because I hope to 
achieve the first assumption with this document. And now, more than ever, does the 
budget need to reflect the informed preferences of the people. 
Tennessee is in a budget crisis. The state faces a structural deficit that will not 
correct itself. Revenues are not adequate to meet expenses, and the future looks even 
bleaker (Wade, 2002). The legislators of this state mayor may not take steps to secure 
adequate funding for the future. Nevertheless, there is an appropriate size of government 
in the minds of its citizens, and Tennesseans are no different than other peoples. Though 
not often stated in dollar terms or population served, this appropriate size usually takes 
the form of "The government should do this" or "The government should stay out of 
that." 
If we return to our previous assumption of an informed populace, we get an 
overall, appropriate size of government. In our budget crisis, money is lacking for many 
programs, and funding cuts have been proposed for future years. That is where a state's 
values begin to be revealed. And with our assumption in place, these values are less 




With this in mind, attention must be given to one of the least understood, yet most 
expensive programs the State of Tennessee undertakes. TennCare was fIrst introduced on 
April 8, 1993 as the capstone to Governor Ned McWherter's administration. He saw it as 
a solution to the problems of Medicaid, one of which was up to twenty percent inflation 
per year. In its fIrst year, the TennCare program was projected to spend $2.9 billion to 
insure almost 1.5 million people (Humphrey, "Governor offers sub", 1993, p. AI). Most 
of these people were already on Medicaid, but hundreds of thousands of people would 
now have access to health insurance for only an additional $100 million over the previous 
fIscal year. Future benefIts were expected to be even greater as the governor expected 
savings to exceed $6.5 billion over its fIrst fIve years. Considering that in the fIscal year 
before TennCare was enacted the State of Tennessee posted a $150 million surplus, 
spending a slightly greater amount in the present to bring about future savings seemed not 
only possible, but the appropriate course of action (Humphrey, "Governor offers sub", 
1993, p. AI). 
Medicaid is the federal government's attempt to grant health care coverage to the 
indigent. The Health Care Financing Agency (HCF A), parent organization to Medicaid, 
Medicare, and other programs, establishes broad goals for the program. Individual states 
then set their own goals and requirements within the HCFA's broad goals and must have 
approval from the HCF A for these state goals. The majority ofthe funding comes from 
the federal government. In the past, most states treated Medicaid as a fee-for-service 
system. If someone on Medicaid goes to the doctor, any tests, treatments, etc., are paid 
for by the state according to the doctor's predetermined rate ("Overview of the Medicaid 
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Program"). By observing the plan, one could see that Medicaid would make the poor 
healthier. But there was no attempt made on controlling costs, and it will be seen just 
how bad this problem is. 
Medicaid in Tennessee was seen as mismanaged. According to the governor, "the 
existing system amounts to 'an elaborate hocus-pocus program of hospital provider fees 
in order to feed our addiction to federal matching funds'" (Humphrey, "Governor offers 
sub", 1993, p. AI). Abandoning it for TennCare and its managed care policies, would 
lead to both massive savings and better health in Tennessee (AI). 
Economic growth in 1993 was anticipated as three to four percent. Mark Greene, 
President ofthe Tennessee Medical Association, stated in regards to this revenue growth, 
"That's way behind medical inflation" (Ferrar, "Caution, enthusiasm", 1993, p. A7). Few 
groups were more skeptical than Greene's association of doctors, but even the TMA had 
to admit TennCare might prove to be more successful than Medicaid. Of course those 
who stood to benefit most favored the plan, while those like the TMA who may actually 
lose somewhat questioned its future funding. Overall, response to the newly introduced 
program could be summed up in two words: enthusiasm and caution. Everyone 
experienced either one or both of these emotions regarding TennCare. Superficially, it 
appeared to achieve important state goals of controlling expenses and increasing public 
health. But despite this, questions abounded, especially concerning state funding of 
TennCare as well as the roles of insurance companies and health care providers (A 7). 
In 1993, President Clinton was making an attempt at creating a national health 
care system. TennCare was designed to bridge the gap between Medicaid and this new 
system, and hopefully serve as a national model along the same lines as any national 
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health care system. In light of futile attempts to reform Medicaid in other states, this new 
plan would in effect start from scratch with a new program designed specifically to 
correct Medicaid's problems. The governor summed his proposal by saying that it, 
'" ... is essentially bringing management to a health care system that now has 
unmanageable growth'" (Humphrey, "Health reform", 1993, AI). 
Obstacles 
Three hurdles needed to be cleared for TennCare to be enacted. First, the 
governor needed support from within the state. The politicians as well as the public as a 
whole would have to endorse TennCare. Next, the governor needed support from those 
who would participate in the program: insurance companies, doctors, and hospitals. 
Finally, after everything else has fallen into place, federal approval would be necessary 
for TennCare to replace Medicaid. 
Affordable health care for all Tennesseans. That was the governor's rallying cry 
for TennCare. With TennCare he hoped to achieve this and fulfill a promise he made 
upon taking office. Coupled with the uncontrollable financial costs Medicaid would 
produce if left unchecked, this attempt at fulfilling his promise brought in support from 
many sectors. 
As previously mentioned, extended health coverage was expected with only a 
minimal increase in expenses. The public overwhelmingly supported it. The General 
Assembly followed suit. Little opposition was offered from them. Only Randy McNally 
publicly criticized the program. The legislature overwhelmingly approved TennCare 
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legislation: the Senate by a margin of 30-1 and the House 91-4 (Ferrar, "TennCare passed 
by Senate, 1993, p. AI). The fIrst obstacle was easily cleared. 
However, TennCare still faced opposition, primarily from doctors and hospitals. 
Insurance agencies saw TennCare as a new opportunity to make money. They offered no 
objection, only widespread support (Ferrar, "Caution, enthusiasm", 1993, p. A7). The 
Tennessee Medical Association (TMA), representing more than 6,000 doctors, expressed 
concern over TennCare (Womack, "Doctors question", 1993, p. AI). Most doctors 
accepted the proposal as inevitable (some still opposed it), but the Tennessee Hospital 
Association (THA) lobbied extensively against it until the state reached compromises 
over several issues pertaining to the hospitals. 
First, the state agreed to allow a 6.75% hospital tax expire. Hospitals had been 
lobbying unsuccessfully for years to remove that tax. Now, to gain their support the 
governor was willing to give it up. Lost revenue for TennCare was to be replaced with 
local money and federal matching funds. Second, the design for TennCare was clarified. 
Much of the opposition was due to the lack of disclosed information about the new 
program. The state would award contracts to Managed Care Organizations (MCOs - run 
by the insurers), which would then, "negotiate rates with hospitals, doctors, pharmacists 
and other health care providers to offer care through the PPOs and HMOs" (Ferrar, 
"TennCare passed by Senate", 1993, AI). Given these concessions, the THA withdrew 
opposition to TennCare, which was subsequently passed by the legislature. The insurers 
were satisfIed, the hospitals were pacifIed, and at least some of the doctors supported it. 
Enough support from the participants in the program was now acquired. The fIrst two 
obstacles had been cleared, now only one remained. 
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Any divergence from the basic Medicaid system or any proposed changes to it 
must be approved from the federal government: the HCF A and its cabinet-level 
department the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). With little 
comment, the DHHS followed up Tennessee's waiver request slowly. There were still 
disagreements over TennCare's funding. However, to speed the process along Gov. 
Mc Wherter met with President Clinton privately. According to the governor, President 
Clinton supported the proposal (Ferrar, "McWherter says Clinton", 1993, p. AI). Shortly 
after this private meeting, and with the fmal stipulation that $185 million more be 
allocated to TennCare, a five year trial period was granted to try out this new program. 
On November 18, 1993, Tennessee was granted a waiver by DHHS, allowing TennCare 
to replace Medicaid within the state (Ferrar, "TennCare gets Washington's OK", 1993, 
AI). TennCare received this approval from the federal government a mere six weeks 
before it was to take effect. However, with all three obstacles cleared, TennCare became 
the new health program for the indigent. However, just because all the pre-
implementation problems were mitigated did not mean that TennCare would have no 
others. Problems were soon to emerge once more. 
On January 1, only one thing was certain regarding TennCare: confusion. A large 
number of specialists did not jo in TennCare. Eligibility had to be determined every time 
a TennCare patient came into a doctor's office (Keirn, 1994, p. AI). Many ofthe doctors 
did not know the changes in the rules, as many regulations were vastly different from 
Medicaid. Worst of all, a large number of the approximately 1.3 million people on 
TennCare were unsure what doctor(s) and what hospital(s) were compatible with their 
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Mca. The TennCare hotline was overwhelmed with telephone calls from both doctors 
and patients (Keim, 1994, p. AI). 
One might expect confusion with a program this large, but the level of confusion 
was staggering. Perhaps the focus had been on obtaining support and approval for 
TennCare. While the need for informing recipients was not entirely ignored, a less than 
adequate amount of attention was spent on informing those effected by the new program. 
Despite the early confusion, people adapted to TennCare. Confusion was eventually 
corrected as people became more accustomed to the program. 
But that only gives a glimpse of the formation of TennCare. The program has 
been altered a few times since its inception over eight years ago. Most of these changes 
have pertained to eligibility requirements or MCOs. Few other changes have been made, 
since the original waiver has determined the state ofTennCare for its fIrst eight years. 
Such changes have been the closing of TennCare to some people or the addition of new 
MCOs. These changes have been made to reinforce the state's goals believed 
accomplished with TennCare. The basic format, though, remains the same. 
What is TennCare 
The need for TennCare was due to a market failure. There were people who went 
without health insurance because they could not afford what was available. However, 
TennCare was an attempt to create a government-supported market solution. The 
government (federa1, state, and local) provided the additional funds needed for these 
people to acquire health insurance. The money was not a direct subsidy, but paid on 
behalf of recipients to the MCOs, who privately made arrangements with doctors and 
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hospitals. It was not a pure market solution, but the state still could maintain control over 
the system with TennCare. 
The theory behind TennCare was managed care. It is the same principle that 
made HMOs so popular. The key to managed care is preventative medicine. Going to 
the doctor regularly, immunizations, and in general maintaining one's health is expected 
to significantly reduce the more costly medical expenses associated with curing diseases, 
which is what Medicaid pays for. Everyone on TennCare is allowed to choose between a 
variety of plans designed with the goal of maintaining one's health. It is important to 
note that the recipients themselves decided what options they needed rather than being 
lumped together under one generic health plan, strongly mirroring the private sector, 
rather than following the often used public sector ideal of a bureaucratic impersonality. 
As of the end of the last federal fiscal year, thirty states, the District of Columbia, 
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have at least part of their Medicaid population on 
managed care (,'2001 Enrollment", 2001). It appears to be the wave of the future, as well 
a viable solution to rising costs in the present. 
An important question still remains. Who then is eligible for TennCare? 
Recipients are usually divided into three categories: Medicaid eligible, the uninsurable, 
and the uninsured. The first group is comprised of those whom every state must cover, 
regardless of their preferences. Federal mandates provide for their health coverage, and 
the U.S. government pays for approximately two-thirds of the health costs of the 
Medicaid eligible. Generally, these people have incomes below the poverty line (though 
they may not be the only ones), and often receive other governrnent benefits designed to 
assist the poor. Concerning this group, the state was trying to control financial costs by 
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changing the way in which health care was provided to them. For more on the official 
poverty level see Appendix D. 
To be classified as uninsurable, and be a member of the second group, one must 
provide an official letter of rejection from a private insurance agency. The uninsurable 
generally have chronic illnesses making them a poor fmancial risk for the private 
insurance companies. This is the first group the state tries to assist in its attempt to 
provide "affordable health care to all Tennesseans." 
The third group, the uninsured, is simply composed of those people who carmot 
afford health insurance. Included in this group are displaced workers whose COBRA 
coverage has expired. The State of Tennessee does not have to provide coverage to this 
group, and a large number of states do not. 
A fourth group can be carved out of these three. Children under the age of 
nineteen with no access to health insurance can obtain coverage under TennCare. 
However, they are not usually grouped together, since they fall into one of these three 
main categories. 
Benefits for TennCare recipients are designed to approximate those in the private 
market. TennCare pays for basic services like hospital care, prescription drugs, and 
doctors visits with co-payments being required of the beneficiaries of the program. The 
myriad of plans includes options for dental care, extensive rehabilitation services, and 
mental health services. In most cases TennCare benefits are typical of private insurance 
companies. There are caps on out-of-pocket expenses and preventative services are 
exempt from co-payments (Appendix A). Only for the Medicaid eligible are the services 
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beyond what the private market would provide, particularly in the area of nursing home 
care. 
But what is the state of these three groups today? Those people eligible for 
Medicaid cannot be excluded from TennCare, nor can any of them be dropped from the 
program as long as they remain Medicaid eligible. They cannot pay premiums nor do 
they have co-payments for their health coverage. They are entitled to free coverage by 
federal law and cannot be asked to bear any of the fmancial responsibility ("Eligibility for 
Copay",2001). 
Currently, all uninsured and uninsurable who have incomes of less than the 
poverty line are also exempt from co-payments and premiums. In addition to these 
people, everyone institutionalized (as in a nursing home) is exempt from premiums and 
co-pays. These people have very low abilities to pay and are assumed to be unable to pay 
their health expenses ("Eligibility for Copay", 2001). 
Everyone else in both the uninsured and uninsurable categories must follow a 
strict schedule of co-payments and premiums. This schedule is based entirely upon 
income. Those who are not excluded from co-payments are divided into two groups: 
those with incomes greater than the poverty line but under 200% of poverty, and those 
with incomes greater than 200% of poverty. The schedule for premiums is divided into 
eleven categories above the poverty line, all based upon family income. For example, the 
lowest bracket in this case lists family income as between 101 % and 119% of poverty 
(see Appendices A and B for more on co-pays and premiums). 
Both co-payments and premiums are cheaper than could be obtained for these 
people in the private market as one would expect since the goal is to enable them to have 
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access to affordable health insurance. Health coverage was for the most part inaccessible 
or too expensive in the private market for the people on TennCare. Thus, the state in 
effect subsidizes health insurance with T ennCare. 
But why is TennCare so important to Tennessee? Currently it serves 
approximately 1.4 million people, about one-fourth of the state's population. This number 
has increased only slightly since the program began in 1994. A year after it began, the 
state closed TennCare to adults in the uninsured category. The financial burden was 
increasing because of the uninsured population. Since TennCare's lowest priority was to 
assist the uninsured, it made sense for the state to close the program to them and remain 
open to the ones who really needed help in obtaining health coverage: the Medicaid 
population and uninsurable (Ferrar, "TennCare accepting no more", 1995, p. A4). 
Only for a few months in 1997 has the program been reopened to the uninsured, 
but has remained open to the uninsurable since it began. In October of2001, Governor 
Don Sundquist attempted to close TennCare to the uninsurable in an attempt to reduce the 
program's growth and save money in light of budgetary concerns. However, U.S. 
District Judge William Haynes issued a court order preventing the closing ofTennCare to 
the uninsurable, citing the need to follow federal regulations in altering TennCare policy 
("Judge orders TennCare", 2001). 
Again, currently the total population on TennCare is about 1.4 million. Of this, 
approximately 818,000 recipients are classified as Medicaid eligible. About 125,000 
people receive TennCare under the uninsurable class. Nearly 458,000 ofthe rest are 
categorized as uninsured. The federal government pays approximately two-thirds of the 
cost of TennCare, even for those not eligible for Medicaid. However, this applies only 
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when the program's enrollment is less than 1.5 million. When the program reaches this 
cap, the state must pay for any additional TennCare recipients (Locker, 1993). 
The Medicaid eligible population has increased and is expected to increase even 
more as the state's population grows over the next few years ("Overview of the Medicaid 
Program"). The number ofuninsurables in the system has increased only slightly over 
TennCare's eight years though it remained open for the entire time. The number of 
uninsured on TennCare has also changed very little, but the reason is precisely because 
the program has not admitted many new uninsured since it has been closed to them for 
nearly seven of its eight years. Considering how close the number ofTennCare 
recipients is to the 1.5 million cap, enrollment is a concern. It is also the reason Governor 
Sundquist attempted to close TennCare to the uninsurable, and is a pressing concern for 
the future. 
Positive and Negatives of TennCare 
TennCare has both its critics and supporters. The supporters cite statistics that put 
TennCare in a favorable light, while, of course, its critics cite problems with the program. 
Neither group has to be wrong; TennCare may have both positive and negative 
consequences. But which is greater? Do the pros outweigh the cons? Attention will now 
be turned to these issues. 
Problems - Fraud and Abuse 
A persistent belief, even among Tennessee's political leadership, about TennCare 
is that it is riddled with fraud, abuse, and waste that can be eliminated to save a great deal 
of money. Van Hilleary, candidate for governor, estimated that as many as 200,000 
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people on TennCare are ineligible (Sharp, "Hilleary says", 2002). However, this high 
number might be the result of political rhetoric. A state audit found the number currently 
improperly receiving benefits less than 20,000 after the recent removal of almost 60,000 
from the TennCare rolls ("Audit fmds", 2002). Far lower than the political response, this 
audit still indicates fraud and abuse of the program still exists. There are ways to abuse 
any government program. Some people will fmd a way to take advantage of humanity's 
sense of fairness. The only way to eliminate the chances of this happening is to spend so 
much money on administration and enforcement that the state eventually loses more 
money than it saves by implementing measures to reduce fraud. 
Though it is not economically beneficial to pursue all possible sources of fraud, 
measures can be taken to reduce waste in TennCare and save money. In fact the state of 
Tennessee has undertaken efforts to reduce fraud and abuse within the system. It began 
with the Fraud and Abuse Hotline, which by August of 1999, had saved, '''Tennessee 
taxpayers over a million dollars by disenrolling people who were not eligible for 
TennCare, 'said TennCare Director Brian Lapps, Sr." ("TennCare Beefs Up", 1999). 
This effort has continued with a website designed to facilitate the reporting of suspected 
abuse of TennCare ("Fraud and Abuse"). Both the hotline and the website have made an 
impact in reducing fraud and abuse by relying on recipients and doctors to report possible 
violations. The total amount of money saved is uncertain, but the estimated one million 
dollars saved by August 1999 has surely been increased. 
Further attempts at mitigating abuse have only been made within the past two 
years. On May 31, 2000, Governor Sundquist signed into law Public Chapter 853 (of the 
10 1 st General Assembly) which classified fraudulent receipt ofTennCare services as a 
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felony. Furthermore, TennCare recipients were to report any changes in their eligibility 
immediately. 
The Rosen settlement was entered on March 12, 2001 and provided for, 
"substantial review and enhancement ofTennCare eligibility determination" ("TennCare 
Update: Quarterly Report", 2001). Included in this plan was the provision for periodic 
monitoring of the eligibility of TennCare recipients (2001). 
Combining the Rosen settlement with Public Chapter 853, the state has an 
effective means of both terminating the coverage of those not eligible for TennCare as 
well as deterring others from fraudulently obtaining that health coverage with the threat 
of a felony sentence. In theory both might prove very effective with but a slight increase 
in administrative cost. 
Though exact data on possible monetary savings have not been published, for the 
fiscal year ending June 30, 2001, over 2600 recipients were recommended for 
termination, with the vast majority coming in the fourth quarter, when both the Rosen 
settlement and PC 853 were in place ("TennCare Quarterly Report", 2001). 
It is a fair assumption that both have lead to lower rates of fraud in the system. 
While this trend may continue in the short run, there is only so much fraud in the system 
that can be eliminated with only these current efforts. Also, though fraud is a problem, 
and will likely remain one, the extent to which it pervades TennCare has been often 
overstated and perceived to be much more widespread than it is due to a few isolated 
instances (Humphrey, "Sundquist'S TennCare", 2001). And, as stated earlier, stronger 
efforts at reducing abuse in the system may actually cost more than they save especially 
if pursued to the extinction of all fraud. 
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Problems - MCOs 
Some of the program's worst problems have been with the Managed Care 
Organizations (MeOs) involved with TennCare. For example, a year ago 
BlueCrosslBlueShield threatened to pull out ofTennCare, citing a lack of profitability. 
However, the state reached an agreement with the MCO to scale back to a maximum of 
300,000 patients in East Tennessee only and remain in the program ("Governor 
announces agreement", 2001). 
A much worse and more visible example happened less than six months ago. 
Access MedPlus, the largest of TennCare's ten MCOs, revealed it did not meet the state's 
required net worth of$12.5 million dollars. In fact its net worth was reported as negative 
$54 million. Following this revelation, Chancellor Ellen Lyle declared the MCO 
in so lvent and ordered the liquidation of its assets on November 2, 2001. Access 
MedPlus's response was that the state assigned a large number of patients with expensive 
medical conditions to the MCO and that adequate compensation was not provided by the 
state (Associated Press, 2001). 
However, only a year earlier, four new MCOs joined TennCare after the state 
accepted their bids. A much more likely scenario involves the mismanagement of funds 
by the leadership of Access MedPlus. Most of the other MCOs have not had any 
problems with their profitability, nor has a judge ordered their liquidation. Most of the 
complaints concerning the MCOs involve the less than prompt payment of medical 
expenses for TennCare enrollees, a concern for doctors. 
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Positive Aspects - Better Health 
Despite its problems past and present, TennCare has been credited with many 
positive results. In 1996, the infant mortality rate for babies covered by TennCare had 
dropped to to.O from 12.2 in 1995 ("Decline in Infant Mortality", 2001). This was a 
significant decline for only one year, and came just two years after TennCare began. In 
that same time period, the infant mortality rate rose for non-TennCare babies from 6.4 to 
6.9. Furthermore, the Bureau ofTennCare cited a First Health study showing 
improvements among TennCare enrollees for the five indicators measured: pre-term 
births, low birth weights, prenatal care, infant case fatality, and infant mortality. Health 
Commissioner Nancy Menke said, "We're definitely seeing a downward trend in the 
overall infant mortality rate, and a majority of that decrease appears to be attributable to 
the TennCare population" ("Decline in Infant Mortality", 2001). 
The Center for Business and Economic Research (CBER) and the Social Science 
Research Institute at the University of Tennessee conducted a survey near the end of 
1997. One important fact about TennCare states that the percentage of TennCare 
recipients who went to emergency rooms has declined by half since the program began. 
The key to this statistic is a twenty- percent increase in regular doctor visits for TennCare 
recipients compared to 1993, before the program began. The rate for doctor visits among 
children also increased in the same time period ("Most TennCare Enrollees", 1998). 
The Bureau ofTennCare issued another press release in October 2000, adding 
further support for TennCare's effectiveness. The stated conclusion was simply that 
TennCare has improved health care. A TennCare study that was cited described how 
children with asthma have received better preventative care under TennCare. Other 
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surveys by the CBER, conducted annually, elaborated upon the decreased usage ofERs 
and the increased importance of regular doctor's visits ("TennCare has Improved Health 
Care",2000). TennCare studies have shown increases in immunizations, prenatal care, 
and mammography under TennCare. An Urban Institute study from 2000 confIrmed the 
increased use of preventative services ("TennCare has Improved Health Care", 2000). 
Facing the combined weight of these studies, it can be concluded that TennCare has been 
effective in improving the health care of Tennesseans. 
Positive Aspects - Possible Monetary Savings 
However, better health may increase costs. Has TennCare achieved its other goal 
of saving the state money? In 1998, Tennessee had the third lowest capitation payment 
per recipient in the country ("TennCare Has Saved Money", 1999). The capitation 
payment is simply, "The basic average cost of payments per covered person" for an entire 
year (Humphrey, "TennCare has", 1993, p. AI). Third lowest in the country is an 
important gain for a state that had supposedly faced skyrocketing Medicaid costs. And 
after only four years, this gain occurred. By lowering the average cost per recipient, 
more people could be served with the same amount of money, which is exactly what 
TennCare is designed to accomplish. 
Furthermore, the estimate of Medicaid expenses for Tennessee based upon the 
average growth rate of other southern states was $1.3 billion dollars in state money for 
1998. TennCare's budget for that year was only $1.1 billion from the state, covering 
everyone on TennCare, not just the Medicaid eligible. More people had better health 
coverage for less money. "In terms of cost management and budget management, 
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TennCare has really been very successful for us," according to State Comptroller John 
Morgan ("TennCare Has Saved Money", 1999). 
TennCare supporters cite even more recent statistics that claim that the state has 
saved more than $2 billion since it began (Miller, 2001). Even if this statistic was 
dismissed because of its source, expenses mandated by Medicaid have been contained at 
the very least. TennCare has been shown to be effective in both saving money and 
improving health within the state. 
The Current Budget Crisis and its Impact on the Future of TennCare 
But in light of the recent budget crisis, can the state really afford it? Not all 
monies ascribed to TennCare pay for the Medicaid population. And even though other 
recipients pay part of their costs and the federal government funds two-thirds of the 
program's expenses, the state still pays health coverage costs for which it is not obligated. 
The budget for the current fiscal year ending June 30, 2001 , is approximately 
$350 million or more out of balance. The state needs at least, but probably more than, 
$350 million in additional revenue just to follow the state constitution's requirement for a 
balanced budget. There are no changes in TennCare that will fix this year's problem, but 
the problem will still exist next year. Next year the budget is expected to be short on 
revenues by nearly $1.2 billion dollars (Wade, 2002). 
That number is a worst case scenario, yet even conservative estimates place next 
year ' s shortfall at more than $700 million. However, the shortfall is expected to continue 
to grow. The state faces a structural deficit. Revenues do not grow as fast the desired 
size of government, which usually mirrors economic growth. There are three solutions to 
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a structural deficit: cut spending, increase the tax rate, or change the tax structure. The 
first two are short-term solutions and the last is hopefully a long-term solution. 
Unfortunately, the legislature has not come to an agreement on which plan to choose. If 
the people of Tennessee decide that TennCare is a program that does not deserve to be 
cut and that it must remain, either the second or third option must be taken. However, the 
latter two will not be discussed in detail here, but in light of the preferences of many who 
favor cutting services (including TennCare), the first must be discussed. 
Of course TennCare's original waiver expired at the end of 1998. After the 
waiver expired, it was renewed for three years. At the end ofthe last calendar year, the 
state was granted an extension of the current waiver. There were no problems with a 
straight renewal of TennCare's original waiver at either point in time. The federal 
government simply acquiesced to the continuance of the status quo. Now the state awaits 
federal approval of a new waiver for the next three years. Despite the ease with which 
the state can renew the waiver, any change to the system would require the state going 
through the approval process again, and most likely could not be achieved quickly. 
Future - Return to Medicaid 
One possible option to change the system is to eliminate TennCare altogether and 
return to the old Medicaid system. About $1 billion in funding would be cut from 
Tennessee's health system under this plan and of course everyone who receives health 
coverage under TennCare, and is not classified as Medicaid eligible, would no longer 
have health coverage (Wade, 2002). This proposal is popular for some politicians. The 
21 
people who would actually lose their coverage are not politically powerful and the 
argument is that with TennCare gone, no tax solution need be taken. 
Hundreds of thousands of Tennesseans would be forced to purchase private 
insurance or go without. Considering the vast majority of these people either were 
denied health coverage or could not afford it, they most likely will go without. Who then 
will pay for them to go to the hospital? Who will pay for their medication? 
Furthermore, since TennCare has been shown to save money over Medicaid, it is 
possible that costs will actually rise if the state reverts to Medicaid. Even if the state 
maintains the managed care philosophy, and savings are proportionally similar to that 
under TennCare, not very much state money will be saved. The people who would lose 
their coverage pay a part of their expenses, as opposed to the Medicaid population, which 
pays none of their expenses and is often granted more extensive services. Furthermore, 
two-thirds of the costs of the program are borne by the federal government. The total 
amount in state funds that could be saved certainly would not be enough to correct next 
year's deficit, nor any future deficits. Tennessee made a statement by extending health 
coverage to those who were believed to be unable to obtain it on their own. How 
equitable is it for the state to now declare that it is just not worth it to help these people? 
Does the state have a moral responsibility to take care of these people if they cannot take 
care of their own medical costs, or does the state owe them nothing more than the 
average taxpayer? 
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Future - The Most Likely Scenario 
Yet there is a budget problem, and hope remains that "reforming" TennCare can 
save some money. Anticipating problems with the budget, in January of2000, Governor 
Sundquist formed the Commission on the Future of TennCare, which notably included 
former Governor Ned McWherter, the architect of TennCare. A year after the 
Commission's report to the governor, Governor Sundquist announced a plan to 
restructure TennCare based upon the Commission's recommendations. 
This plan is estimated to save approximately $150 million per year over the next 
ten years and forego slightly more than twice that amount in federal money. The savings 
would come by reducing benefits to some recipients and dropping about 179,000 
enrollees from the system. Ofthis number 4,000 are children in families with incomes at 
least 200 percent of the poverty line. Ofthe adults 40,000 are eligible for both Medicaid 
and Medicare. The other 135,000 adults are reported to have incomes over the poverty 
level (Miller, 2001). 
In addition to dropping these people from TennCare, the governor's proposal 
would divide the program into three pieces. TennCare Medicaid would serve an 
estimated 950,000 Medicaid eligible people when implemented. Benefits would be 
similar to those in other states, except that optional Medicaid benefits, like private duty 
nurses, would not be included (Miller, 2001). 
TennCare Standard would be the primary extension of health coverage to the 
indigent not on Medicaid. Benefits would be similar to commercial plans for small 
businesses. The approximately 300,000 people who are expected to qualify would not 
have access to group health insurance and must either be adults living under the poverty 
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line, or children living under 200 percent of poverty. The uninsurable would be primarily 
included in this category, however, simply being denied coverage by a private fIrm would 
not be enough to guarantee one eligibility for TennCare. This population would pay 
premiums on a sliding scale according to their incomes, much like they do now under 
TennCare (Miller 2001). 
The last piece of the TennCare puzzle would be named TennCare Assist. The 
number of people served by this part of TennCare is uncertain, but the state would not 
provide health coverage to them. Instead, the state would give a direct subsidy to 
families with lower incomes to purchase private insurance through their employers 
(Miller, 2001). 
The governor's plan would reinforce certain principles of TennCare. It is a 
program of last resort, assisting someone when there is no other help available. In 
addition to this, the state continues its goal of affordable health care to all Tennesseans. 
But not only would all Tennesseans have access to health coverage, children would 
especially be taken care of, considering they have less ability to earn a living than adults 
do ("TennCare Program Design", 2002). But this new program would also attempt to 
encourage a private market solution through TennCare Assist. 
Some minor changes have been made to this plan between the time it was 
presented to Tennesseans and the time it was submitted to the federal government. 
However, the basic outline remains the same. Only minor details have changed. For 
example, one of the four groups ofTennCare Standard offers eligibility to someone at 
250% of poverty, rather than 200%, without access to group health insurance. See 
Appendix C for the time line from the governor's submitted proposal ("TennCare 
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Program Design", 2002). Governor Sundquist has obtained some legislative support and 
praise from his possible successors concerning this plan. However, he does not need it. 
He only needs approval from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in the 
HCFA in the DHHS ("Miller, "Governor splits TennCare", 2001). Thus, the new 
TennCare plan will go into effect pending federal approval, which is slow in coming once 
again. 
This is an intriguing proposal. It appears to save the state money by dropping 
certain Tennesseans who might be able to purchase private insurance rather than relying 
on the state. Furthermore, it would continue the recent tradition of the state to extend 
health coverage to those who are least able to afford it. However, any attempt at 
maintaining TennCare would not save very much money. One hundred fifty million will 
certainly not be enough to solve Tennessee's budget problem. A new tax option, like an 
income tax, increase in the sales tax, or a tax on services will be necessary to "save" 
TennCare and many other programs. 
Conclusion 
While TennCare is not the only target of criticism, nor of proposed budget cuts, it 
does draw much of the blame for Tennessee's budget crisis. Thus, it boils down to a 
simple question for all taxpayers to answer. Is TennCare worth it? We cannot just stick 
our heads in the sand. The state has to do something for these people. We have no 
choice but to pay for the Medicaid population. But should the state be responsible for the 
other people covered by TennCare? Does the state owe them anything if they are unable 
to help themselves? It will cost money to pay for their health coverage, so where will 
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that money come from? The main criticism of TennCare is that it costs a lot of money, 
often wmecessarily (fraud and abuse), but the result is quite often poor a poor argument. 
Tennessee has historically had a low tax burden, but to save TennCare that may need to 
change. With some people arguing for equity and the continuance ofTennCare, and with 
others arguing for the elimination of TennCare and for low taxes, conflict is certain. But 
which side is right? What is best for Tennessee? 
Though the question is simple, the answer is very complex considering all the 
issues before taxpayers. However, for the government to work appropriately, the people 
of Tennessee must understand all the issues and their preferences involving government. 
Remaining ignorant about pertinent issues facing all citizens will certainly lead to more 
confusion in the future, if that is possible. 
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Appendix A: 
Schedule of Co-payments 
Bureau of TennCare 
nuH."e Searc!, TennesseeAnytime 
F&A Depat1ment Home 
NEW TE CARE CO-PAY SCHEDULE FOR 
U INSUREDS A D UNI SURABLES 
Note: Medicaid eligibles are exempt from co-pays. 
Poverty 
levels 










• $25 for emergency room use (waived if 
admitted) 
• $5 for PCP and Community Mental Health 
Agency services other than preventive 
services and mental health case 
management 
• $15 for specialists 
• $5 for prescription drugs 
• $100 for hospital stay 
• $50 for emergency room use (waived if 
admitted) 
• $10 for PCP and Community Mental Health 
Agency services other than preventive 
services and mental health case 
management 
• $25 for speCialists 
• $10 for prescription drugs 
• $200 for hospital stay 
Preventive services are exempt from co-pay obligations. 
Deductibles are eliminated. 
Maximum out-of-pocket expenses are limited as follows: 
100%-200% poverty $1,000 individual; $2,000 family 
200% poverty and above $2,000 individual; $4,000 family 
file://C:\Jason\Honors\Bureau%200fOIo20TennCare.htm 
Page 1 of2 
5/9/02 
Bureau of TennCare Page 2 of2 
FAA Dep~ent _Horne I Tenness~ Anyti[!1e Home I Pnvaq Statement I Use( Survey I Contact Us 
fiie://C:\Jason\Honors\Bureau%20of%20TennCare.htm 5/9/02 
Appendix B: 
Schedule of Premiums 
Bureau ofTennCare http://www.state.tn.usltenncare/povprem.htm 
10f2 
':::' iFF ",." I "'." I $no. $80' '"'' '''HS mu, r 
1- I I I I I r-_I r 
Family 
Premium 
;----11 I I I I r 
Percentage P -IOO% 101 % 120% 140%-169% 170% 200%-209% 1 210%-219% ~0%-239% 240%-269% 270%-299% r 
po:~rty I -119% -139% -199% I 1,1 
II I I I I I I I ~1 ~1 11 'lllr 
I .l -1,374 1,505 I 1,642 I 1,848 I 2,060 II r-;- 0-687 688 - 818 819-955 956-1.161 I 1,162 1 1.375 - 1.436 1
1 
1,437-~~~f 
~1--0---9-2-2-f-9-2-3---1-,0-9-7 ~~~ 1,845- 1,928- ~~I 2.481-I I 1,282 I 1,558 I 1,844 1,927 2,021 I 2,204 I 2,480 2,765 
~F-I'157 ~I 1,378 - I 1,609 - ~56 -- 2,315- 2.419 - 1 2,537 - ~~r j I i ,377 1,608 I 1,955 I 2,314 2,418 2,536 2,765 I 3,112 I 3.470 . 
0-1,392 I li~~:6- li~g;5- ~~ 22~:g9- ~I 33~;i7- ~[ 34~:;5- r 
1----~r-0--I-,6-2-7-i~ 1,937- 2,263 - 2,751- '~I 3,401- 3,566- I 3,890-~ I 1,936 2,262 2,750 3,254 I 3.400 3,565 3,889 4,377 I 4.880 1 
~ 0-1,862 I~I 2,217 - 2,589 - ~ 3,725 --~. 4,081 - ~ 5,010-
Ii- I 2'216 ~'588 3,147 I 3,724 3,892 I 4,080 4,450 I 5,009 5,585 
l-'-----f--0---2-,09-7-~ 2,496- 2,916- 3,545- 4,195-~ 4,596- ~ 5,642- r I 2,495 2.915 3,544 4,194 4,383 I 4,595 I 5,012 I 5,641 6,290 
' ~. ---------il~0---2-'3-3-2-'1i--2-'3-3-3-- ~~ 3,942- 4,665 - ~~~~ 
2,775 I 3,241 I 3,941 4.664 4,874 I 5, I 09 I 5,573 I 6,273 I 6,995 I 
9 F~~~~~ 5,366 - 5,625 - 6,136- 6,906 - f 3,055 3,568 4,338 5.134 5,365 5,624 6,135 6,905 7,700 .~ 0-2,802 ~~~~~ 5,857 - 6, 140 - 6.698 - ~ 3,334 3,895 4 ,735 5,604 5,856 6,139 6,697 7,537 8.405 
'For each 
additional 





Monthly Premiums for Uninsured Enrollees with Income Above 400% of Poverty Monthly Premium for Uninsurable Enrollees with Income Above 4000/. of Poverty 
4/23/01 12:57 PM 
Bureau ofTennCare hnp:/ /www.state.tn.usltenncarelpovprem. him 
I 
1 1 
Individual i $195.84 $201.67 Individual $238.50 
I 
Premium I Premium 
I 
Family $489.19- 1 1 $504.03 I' Family 1 $595.72 I Premium Premium 
1 I 
I 
Percenlage 400% - 749% 750% -Over Percentage 400% -749% 
Of of 
Poverty I Poverty 
[ ~ I I 1- ~ 
Family Size 
I 1 I Family Size 
-
1 2,748 - 5,153 1 
I 1 I I 5,154 - Over I 2,748-5,153 , 
3,688 - 6,915 6,916 - Over F ' 3,688 - 6,915 4,628 - 8,1>78 8,679 - Over 3 I 4,628 - 8,678 




5,568 - 10,440 
r---------_I 
;----1------- .1 1 
6,508 - 12,203 12,204 - Over I 1 6,508 - 12,203 
-
I I I [ 
_ . 
6 7,448 - 13,965 \3 ,966 - Over 6 7,448 - \3,965 
I 
7 
,I 8,388 - 15,728 1 I 15,729 - Over I 7 I 8,388 - 15,728 
I 1 I I I I 
I 
8 9,328 - 17,490 17,491-0ver 8 9,328 - 17,490 
I 9 I 10,268- 19,253 I I 19,254 - Over 9 I 10,268 - 19,253 1 
r- IO' I 11,208 - 21 ,015 1 121'016-0~ 10 [ 11 ,208 - 21,015 
'For each ,~ additional family member 940 - 1,755 1,756 - Over 940 - 1,755 over 10, add per month 
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Appendix C: 




NO TE: The following dates are proposed for planning purposes only. These dates are subject to 







Extension of existing TennCare waiver begins 
State will begin notifying entire TennCare population 
about the proposed new program and will begin 
classifying enrollees according to new eligibility 
criteria 
New eligibility criteria go into effect; current enrollees 
who meet the new eligibility criteria will remain on 
TennCare 
State will begin disenrolling current TennCare 
members who do not meet new eligibility criteria 
Subject to legislative appropriation, state will conduct 
an open enrollment period for potential new eligibles, 
using income thresholds for TennCare Standard 
approved by the General Assembly in its spring 2002 
session; a continuous open enrollment period may 
also be authorized for subgroups of the demonstration 
populations, subject to availability of funds 
Modified TennCare Medicaid program begins 
TennCare Standard begins 
Coverage begins for new TennCare members 
identified during the fall open enrollment period 
Benefit changes go into effect 
Subject to appropriation, state will conduct an open 
enrollment period for potential new eligibles, using 
income thresholds for TennCare Standard approved 
by the General Assembly in its spring 2002 session; a 
continuous open enrollment period may also be 
authorized for certain subgroups of the demonstration 





Enrollment procedure used for TennCare Standard to 
be evaluated 
Subject to appropriation, state will conduct an open 
enrollment period for potential new eligibles, using 
income thresholds for TennCare Standard and 
TennCare Assist approved by the General Assembly 
in its spring 2003 session; a continuous open 
enrollment period may also be authorized for certain 
subgroups of the demonstration population, subject to 
availability of funds 
TennCare Assist begins 
Coverage begins for new TennCare members 
identified during the fall open enrollment period 
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Appendix D: 
Official DHHS Poverty Standards -2002 
2002 HHS Poverty Guidelines 
-
Size of 48 Contiguous 
Family Unit States and D.C. Alaska Hawaii 
1 $ 8,860 $11,080 $10,200 
2 11,940 14,930 13,740 
3 15,020 18,780 17,280 
4 18,100 22,630 20,820 
5 21,180 26,480 24,360 
6 24,260 30,330 27,900 
7 27,340 34,180 31,440 
8 30,420 38,030 34,980 
I For each additional 3,080 3,850 3,540 person, add 
